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Abstract: In this paper, an approach to protecting virtual machines (VMs) against TCP SYN flood attack in a 
cloud environment is proposed. An open source cloud platform Eucalyptus is deployed and 
experimentation is carried out on this setup. We investigate attacks emanating from one VM to another in a 
multi-tenancy cloud environment. Various scenarios of the attack are executed on a webserver VM. To 
detect such attacks from a cloud provider’s perspective, a security mechanism involving a packet sniffer, 
feature extraction process, a classifier and an alerting component is proposed and implemented. We 
experiment with k-nearest neighbor and artificial neural network for classification of the attack. The 
dataset obtained from the attacks on the webserver VM is passed through the classifiers. The artificial 
neural network produced a F1 score of 1 with the test cases implying a 100% detection accuracy of the 
malicious attack traffic from legitimate traffic. The proposed security mechanism shows promising results 
in detecting TCP SYN flood attack behaviors in the cloud.  
 





Cloud computing is an emerging technological advancement in providing information technology 
infrastructure, platform and software as services over the Internet. Cloud computing is steadily being 
adopted by organizations as private, public or hybrid clouds and recently there has been an emergence of 
open source cloud platforms available for deployment, development and research into cloud computing. 
Although, cloud computing offers advantages such as reduced service cost and better utilization of 
resources [1], some organizations are reluctant in moving their corporate services on public clouds 
considering the security of their data and services. For organizations to transition to clouds, it becomes 
important for cloud providers to assure significant level of security to the clients. Together with existing 
security mechanisms such as firewalls and intrusion detection systems, cloud providers can also have 
security mechanisms built into the architecture of the cloud in assuring high level of security to the clients 
[2]. 
1.1. Cloud Computing 
Cloud computing has a service driven model in providing cloud resources to the users [1]. Ideally, a cloud 
provider leases resources to users as grouped services from three conceptual layers; infrastructure as a 
  
service (IaaS), platform as a service (PaaS), and software as a service (SaaS).  
Cloud computing adoption can be categorized as public, private and hybrid clouds. The use or 
deployment of each of these types is based on the needs pertaining to it. Public clouds basically reside 
outside of an organization’s premises and is accessible via the Internet. Many of the established cloud 
services such as Amazon Web Services [3], Microsoft Azure [4] and Salesforce [5] reside as public clouds 
that are accessible to users all over the globe and the users are mainly charged based on the services used. 
Private clouds reside in an organization’s premises. Such clouds are preferred by large organizations who 
are sensitive to storing critical organization data on the public cloud due to the privacy and security issues. 
Over the years, a number of large organizations are preferring to have private cloud computing 
infrastructure for the organization’s internal use and an example is the United States Central Intelligence 
Agency’s (CIA) private cloud which had been setup by Amazon [6]. Hybrid clouds allow organizations to use 
a mix of private and public clouds to provide services. Using this model, organizations can move their 
on-premises services to public clouds when needed. 
1.2. Denial of Service Attacks 
Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks are one of the common attacks 
on the Internet today. DoS attacks aim to exhaust a system’s resources such that it compromises its ability to 
provide the intended service and thus rendering it unavailable. The Cisco 2014 Annual Security report 
ranks the effects of DoS attacks in the magnitude of high severity [7]. DoS attacks which mainly target 
websites can also paralyze Internet service providers. For instance, in August 2013, the Chinese 
government reported that the largest DDoS attack it had ever faced shut down the Internet in China for 
about four hours. Also in March, 2013, a 300Gbps DDoS attack known as DNS amplification attack was 
observed on the Spamhaus website hosted at CloudFlare where around 30,000 DNS open resolvers were 
utilized to target the website [8]. DoS attacks can be generally classified into three categories [9]: 
1. Volume based DoS Attacks: These affect servers when a high volume of such traffic is directed towards 
it. Examples are ICMP flood and UDP flood attacks.  
2. Protocol based DoS Attacks: These use specific Internet protocols to consume the server’s resources. 
Examples of these are TCP SYN flood attack and Ping-of-death.  
3. Application based DoS Attacks: these target the weakness of the application. This is also known as 
Application Layer attacks and examples of this are Slowloris attack and DNS amplification attack. 
2. Related Work 
To secure cloud environments against DoS attacks a number of security mechanisms and frameworks 
have been proposed. An interesting work by Shea and Liu [10] highlight the performance of VMs under DoS 
attacks where the researchers experimented on different virtualization technologies of Kernel-based Virtual 
Machine (KVM), Xen, OpenVZ and Vanilla under TCP SYN flood attacks. A comprehensive set of benchmarks 
for CPU, network, memory and file system performance were considered. Although the research was 
centered more on virtualization than on cloud computing, its finding are important for this research as 
virtualization is at the core of cloud platforms. Another external DoS attack scenario is investigated by 
Lonua et al. [11] on a Eucalyptus private cloud. To detect the attacks from outside, the authors proposed to 
have Snort [12] set up on each VM and the monitoring and alerting information is directed to a basic 
analysis and security system with its web analysis tool being integrated to the front-end of Eucalyptus. 
Gupta et al. [1] had proposed a profile based Network Intrusion Prevention System (NIPS) for securing 
cloud environments. The open source cloud platform used by the researchers was OpenNebula [13]. Here 
the NIPS which is managed by a cloud administrator examines packets originating from and destined to 
virtual interfaces of separate VMs and monitors it against the VM’s profile. An initial VM profile is created by 
  
monitoring all traffic that passes to and from the VM. This traffic is compared against an attack signature 
database and using the attacks and normal behaviors of the traffic a profile is created. The profile can be 
updated later by the administrator. The ICMP flood and TCP SYN flood attacks had been studied by the 
researchers. An alert and response component relayed the necessary information to the administrator. The 
research had presented a novel framework design of an intrusion prevention system but minimal 
evaluation of the DoS attacks detection accuracy had been presented. 
Modi et al. [14] present a comprehensive review of intrusion detection techniques for cloud 
environments. They highlight on the use of data mining and machine learning techniques for an anomaly 
based intrusion detection system such as artificial neural networks, fuzzy logic, associate rules, support 
vector machine, genetic algorithm and hybrids of these. The authors do state that accuracy of some of these 
techniques are low. Another important factor to consider using these techniques is the experimentation 
dataset that is used. A common dataset that has been heavily used by researchers is the KDD CUP 1999 
intrusion detection dataset despite it having some discrepancies as reported in literature – discrepancies 
such as imbalance of dataset and the aging factor of the dataset itself [15]. Singh and Bansal [16] have used 
NSL KDD dataset - a subset of the KDD CUP 1999 dataset with artificial neural network classifiers. They 
used multilayer perceptron, radial base function, logistic regression, and voted perception and evaluated 
the performance of each. 
 
Fig. 1. Design of the DoS attack detection mechanism in Eucalyptus cloud. 
 
3. Proposed Approach 
As discussed in the literature, many researchers have worked on intrusion detection systems and 
mechanisms for DoS attacks on hosts residing on the cloud and the attacker is externally situated from the 
cloud. However, due to the multi-tenancy nature of cloud environments, especially for clouds deployed as 
IaaS models, out of all tenants residing on the cloud, there can be malicious tenants who can cause harm to 
legitimate tenants of the cloud. Thus, through this research work, the issue of DoS attacks within the cloud 
is explored. An open source cloud platform – Eucalyptus is used for the experimentation. DoS attack in the 
form TCP SYN flood attack is performed on a VM running a webserver. The webserver has the TCP SYN 
cookies enabled which is commonly considered to protect the servers from TCP SYN flood attacks [17]. 
The proposed approach (Fig. 1) is designed for the detection of TCP SYN flood attacks on VMs by VMs in 
  
Eucalyptus cloud. The approach can be used for DoS attacks coming from the external network also, 
however in the experimentation all attacks are carried out by VMs within the cloud.  
3.1. Eucalyptus Cloud Platform  
Elastic Utility Computing Architecture for Linking Your Programs To Useful Systems (Eucalyptus) is an 
open source cloud platform under the Hewlett-Packard (HP) Helion [18] initiative which provides 
organizations opportunity to establish IaaS private clouds. Eucalyptus was released in 2008 and has over 
the years matured into a robust private cloud computing platform. Eucalyptus cloud offers many features 
such as compute, storage, networking, cloud management and compatibility with AWS APIs. Eucalyptus 
compromises of five main components and a sixth optional component of which all are stand-alone 
web-services. The components and the functions of each are provided in Table 1 [19]. For this research, 
experimentation has been carried out on Eucalyptus version 4.1. 
 
Table1. Eucalyptus Components and Functionality 
 
 
3.2. Sniffer and Feature Extraction  
Virtualization on the NC requires a bridged interface namely br0to be setup. All the local interfaces of the 
VMs then attach to the bridged interface in order to communicate with the external network. Ideally, for any 
packets coming through the bridged interface from the external network, it is forwarded to the iptables 
firewall within the Linux operating system. The security feature in Eucalyptus which allows VMs to be 
assigned a security group requires the security group rules to be implemented as firewall rules in the NC’s 
local firewall – iptables.  
 
Table 2. Captured Packet Fields 
 
 
In this proposed approach, a packet sniffer is placed on the NC’s base operating system, which captures 
certain packet information for a certain time and then directs the sniffed packet fields to an extractor script 
to calculate and extract time-based traffic flow features for each IP address that is communicated through 
the bridged interface. This includes all packets flowing from the external network (outside Eucalyptus) to 
the NC and VMs, packets flowing from the NCs and VMs to the external network and packets flowing from 
VMs to VMs in Eucalyptus cloud. The sniffer used for the purpose of this research is a custom built sniffer, 
developed in C language using the libpcap library for packet capturing on Linux systems. For cloud 
providers, protecting tenants’ privacy is paramount therefore a balance was reached between the volume 
and nature of data captured to protect the tenants from DoS attack while at the same time safeguard the 
  
privacy. After careful consideration the data capture had been limited to 6 TCP fields (Table 2), completely 
leaving the TCP payload untouched. 
The packet fields captured by the packet sniffer is input to the feature extraction script which calculates 
the traffic flow features (Table 3). These features are then used by the classifier to differentiate between 
legitimate and malicious traffic. 
 
Table 3. Traffic Features in Traffic Flow 
 
3.3. Classifier  
3.3.1. k-nearest neighbor 
The k-nearest neighbor (kNN) is a simple, instance-based learning algorithm used for pattern recognition 
problems. kNN works by measuring the distance between a query instance and a set of instances in a 
dataset. The distance between two instances with N features such that x = {x1, x2, x3…, xN} and y = {y1, y2, 








),(                                     (1) 
 
3.3.2. Artificial neural network 
An artificial neural network (ANN) is a set of processing units called ‘neurons’ when assembled in a 
closely interconnected network offers some features of the biological neural network [20]. ANNs have been 
adopted as classifiers for complex problems such as cancer classification [21] and image classification [22]. 
A feedforward ANN classifier has been used where the neurons are connected by links of weights with real 
values. Each neuron consists of a sigmoid activation function which transforms the weighted sum of the 
inputs producing an output from the neuron. The number of hidden layer neurons is determined as an 
average of the input and output layer neurons. Back propagation is used as the learning algorithm with 
learning rate set to 0.3 and momentum as 0.2. Fig.2 illustrates the ANN model used for experimentation. 
An alert component is also integrated and is responsible for relaying DoS attacks detected by the 
classifier to the administrator for further action. Altogether, the sniffer, feature extraction process, classifier 
(kNN or ANN) and alert component depicts a real-time intrusion detection system. 
4. Experimentation  
This section covers the details of Eucalyptus cloud setup, the tools needed to simulate active users in the 
cloud, performing attacks and generating the dataset.  
  
 
Fig. 2. Artificial neural network model. 
 
4.1. Eucalyptus Cloud Setup  
The cloud is deployed with Eucalyptus version 4.1 software. It runs on 10 physical servers and has a 
dedicated Storage Area Network (SAN) resulting in a computation capacity of 120 vCPUs and storage 
capacity of 7.3 TB. Each of the servers has the minimal version of CentOS 6.6 installed and the cloud 
components are installed on top of the operating system. The deployment of each Eucalyptus component is 
onto individual physical servers which provides these components dedicated server resources to carry out 
the functions. The SAN is used as a form of block storage for the SC. The cloud uses the KVM hypervisor to 
virtualize the computing, network and storage resources and deliver on-demand IaaS. Details of installing 
Eucalyptus cloud can be found in the Eucalyptus official installation guide [19].  
 
Table 4. Security Groups for VMs 
 
 
Eucalyptus cloud has to be configured to allow components to communicate with each other. The VMs 
once launched should be able to communicate with each other and the external network with a certain level 
of security in place. The Edge networking mode which is used in this setup removes the need to place a 
single Linux server in the data path for all VMs running in a single cluster and additionally removes the 
need to configure the underlying network to allow passing of VLAN tagged packets in the cloud [19]. A pool 
of private and public IP addresses is also required to be allocated to Eucalyptus.  
Eucalyptus implements a feature known security groups in the cloud. Security groups act as virtual 
firewalls supporting ingress packet filtering for VMs they are applied to. Security groups are implemented 
from the CLC onto the VMs and is applied as iptables rules on the NCs. For the VMs on this test bed, two 
security groups are setup: one for the user and attack VMs and the other for the web server VMs (Table 4). 
4.2. Testbed  
In the testbed, different roles are assigned to VMs. As the research is based on VM to VM communication 
and attacks, it is necessary to simulate an active cloud environment where there are necessary VM to VM 
  
communication. In the cloud, 3 types of VMs are setup - firstly 10 m1.small (256MB memory, 1 vCPU, 5 GB 
disk) instances of CentOS 6.5 and Ubuntu 12.04 are evenly setup as user VMs whose tasks is to continuously 
but randomly request for webpages from the webserver VM. The webserver VM is a m3.xlarge (2GB 
memory, 4 vCPU, 15 GB disk) instance which runs an Apache 2.2.15 webserver hosting a website of 6 
webpages. 2 m1.xlarge (1GB memory, 2 vCPU, 10 GB disk) instances are setup as attack VMs whose tasks 
are to perform TCP SYN flood attacks based on defined times and scenarios. 
Siege which is a webserver load test and benchmarking tool was used to simulate active and legitimate 
users of the webserver [23]. The Siege parameters were set such that for user VM 1 to VM 10, Siege would 
request for any of the 6 webpages from the webserver at a random time within a specific time. For example, 
for user VM 4, Siege would request for a webpage from the webserver any time between 20 seconds and 
then request for another webpage in the next 20 seconds. 
4.3. TCP SYN Flood  
TCP SYN flood attack uses the 3-way handshake connection establishment mechanism of TCP protocol to 
carry out the attack. In a normal scenario (Fig. 3a) the client would send a SYN packet to the server as a 
request to establish a connection with the server, after which the server would acknowledge the receipt of 
request and send a packet to the client with SYN and ACK bits set. At this point the server would have 
allocated resources for this client. The client finishes the handshake by sending the ACK back to the server. 
In a TCP SYN flood (Fig. 3b), the client, either with its own IP address or spoofed address(es) send multiple 
SYN packets to the server at a very high rate. Once the server receives these SYN packets, it allocates 
resources on the server and sends a packet with SYN and ACK bits set to either the client or to the spoofed 
addresses. The client or the spoofed address(es) however do not respond to the server with the ACK packet. 
 
  
                             Fig. 3a.Normal TCP 3-Way           Fig. 3b.TCP SYN flood   
                                   Handshake                  (No ACK from Client) 
 
To carry out TCP SYN flood attacks, the hping3 [24] tool is utilized which allows customized SYN packets 
to be send to the server. Four scenarios of the attacks are carried out over a total duration of 4 hours and the 
details are summarized in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Attack Scenarios 
 
  
5. Dataset  
In the 4 hour experimentation which involved user VMs sending legitimate requests and attack VMs 
sending malicious requests to the webserver VM, the resulting outcome of the sniffer and the feature 
extraction process yielded a dataset of 5026 instances x 9 features. From this 5026 instances, 4391 
instances were from user VMs while 635 instances were from attack VMs. The difference in the two classes 
of legitimate and malicious traffic from VMs is due to the fact that there were 10 VMs sending legitimate 
traffic while only 2 VMs were sending malicious traffic and the sniffer and the feature extraction process 
function based on capturing and extracting features for each incoming IP address in the traffic flow for the 
specified time internal of 5 seconds. 
The original dataset is split into a ratio of 4:1 representing the training and test dataset groups. After 
splitting, the training dataset consists of 4021 instances of which 3513 instances belong to the legitimate 
class while 508 instances belong to malicious class. The 1005 instances belonging to the test dataset 
consists of 878 and 127 instances from the legitimate and malicious classes respectively. An extract of the 
original dataset is provided in Table 6. It contains 10 instances x 9 features and an additional column which 
labels the instances as either malicious or legitimate. 
 
Table 6. Dataset Generated (Extract) 
 
6. Results and Discussion  
6.1. Benchmarking Webserver  
 
Fig. 4. Performance degradation of webserver. 
 
  
As the aim of any DoS attack is to exhaust a system’s resources such that it unable to provide service to 
legitimate clients, the TCP SYN flood attack aims for the same. The performance of the webserver VM which 
was under attack by one and two VMs (simultaneously) can be known by measuring transactions from an 
arbitrary client requesting for service when the webserver is under attack and when it is not. Such a task 
can be performed by Siege which has a benchmarking feature where the VM running Siege sends requests 
to the webserver without any delay between the requests. For a normal scenario where there are no attacks 
on the webserver but only legitimate requests by the user VMs and the four scenarios where the webserver 
is under attack, the benchmark results are shown in Fig. 4. 
Fig. 4 shows the effect of TCP SYN flood attacks on the webserver in responding to legitimate requests by 
the benchmarking VM. In a normal scenario where there are only legitimate requests coming from user 
VMs, it is observed that on average 911.75 transactions or hits can be carried out by the benchmarking VM 
in a second. Performance of the webserver however deteriorates significantly with all attack scenarios. The 
performance of the webserver is affected most for attack scenario 3 where the webserver is slower by 
10,131 times compared to the benchmarked normal rate. All transaction or hit values for all scenarios are 
based on averages obtained from five tests in each scenario. 
6.2. Webserver System Resources and Bandwidth  
This section looks at the effects that occur on the webserver under the TCP SYN flood attacks with respect 
to system load, memory usage and bandwidth utilization.  
The webserver VM was setup with a memory size of 2 GB and processing capacity of 4 vCPU. When a TCP 
SYN flood of a high magnitude of such was carried out, it was presumed that the server would be exhausted 
of memory and processing with this attack. However, empirical observations show that there is no 
significant change on these two system resources when handling attack traffic. Fig.5a and Fig.5b are 
obtained by monitoring the memory and system load on the webserver. Fig.5a shows that there is slight 
increase in memory usage when the 5 minute TCP SYN flood attacks are in progress, however this is not a 
significant change from the normal memory usage. Fig.5b shows that the system load is not significantly 
affected by the attacks. The observations presented are for first 30 minutes of attack scenario 4. Similar 
results are observed for other attacks. 
A significant change in bandwidth utilization is observed in all four scenarios as the attack VMs flood the 
webserver with SYN packets using 40 –1500 bytes of data in the packets. From Table 7, it is clear that one of 
the symptoms of anon-going TCP SYN flood attack is much higher incoming and outgoing network traffic 
compared to normal, however this should be differentiated from cases of flash events in which a large 
number of legitimate clients simultaneously access a webserver [25], which could create some false positive 
identification by an intrusion detection system. 
          Fig. 5a. Webserver memory usage.               Fig. 5b.Webserver system load. 
 
  
Table 7. Webserver Bandwidth 
 
 
6.3. Classification Accuracy  
The kNN and ANN classifiers are first subjected to a training phase with 5-fold cross validation which is 
mainly performed to prevent the classifiers from overfitting. The goal of the training phrase is to identify 
the best classifier model of kNN and ANN such that the instances from the test dataset can be subjected to 
this model. For the kNN classifier the training dataset is evaluated using k = {1, 3, 5, 7, 9} neighbors thus 
forming 5models of the kNN classifier. Two different ANN classifier models are used by having 1 and 2 
hidden layers in the two ANNs. For ANN model 1 where 1 hidden layer is used, 5 neurons are placed on this 
layer for computation. For ANN model 2, the 2 hidden layers contain 7 and 4 neurons respectively. 
Increasing the number of hidden layers can enable the classifier to get better accuracy at an increased cost 
of computation and possible overfitting. 
In this classification problem, the effectiveness of the classifier model is determined by a single F1 Score. 
The F1 score strikes a balance between the precision and recall values for a classifier. The precision of a 
classifier model is defined by the number of true positives divided by the number of true positives and false 
positives and recall is defined as the number of true positives divided by the number of true positives and 
the number of false negatives. An instance is considered to be true positive classified if it is malicious and 
classified as malicious, true negative classified if it is legitimate and is classified as legitimate, false positive 
classified if it is legitimate and is classified as malicious and false negative if it is malicious and is classified 
as legitimate by the classifier. The F1 score is thus calculated as follows: 
 
           
                  
                
                                                                        
 
The precision, recall and F1 scores have been calculated for the 5 kNN and 2 ANN classifier models, and 
the results are presented in Table 8and Table 9respectively. By comparing the F1 scores it is found that the 
ANN models have the highest F1 scores and it is the same for 1 and 2 hidden layer models. As the 1 hidden 
layer model takes less computation time it is chosen over the 2 hidden layer model to be used for running 
test cases. 
The precision, recall and F1 scores have been calculated for the 5 kNN and 2 ANN classifier models, and 
the results are presented in Table 8and Table 9respectively. By comparing the F1 scores it is found that the 
ANN models have the highest F1 scores and it is the same for 1 and 2 hidden layer models. As the 1 hidden 
layer model takes less computation time it is chosen over the 2 hidden layer model to be used for running 
test cases. 
Table 8. Precision, Recall and F1 Scores for kNN Classifier Models (Training) 
 
  
Table 9. Precision, Recall and F1 Scores for ANN Classifier Models (Training)  
 
 
When the 1 hidden layer ANN model is subjected to a test dataset of 1005 instances of which 878 
instances are from the legitimate class and 127 are from the malicious class, the classifier gives a F1 score of 
1. This is the maximum desired F1 score for the test dataset and implies a 100% classification accuracy for 
all test instances. Table 10 shows the result obtained during the test run. As the test instances were not part 
of the training phase, and thus were unknown to the classifier, it implies that the classifier had learnt to 
classify malicious traffic instances from legitimate ones during the training phase and then appropriately 
classified the given test instances. 
 
Table 10. Precision, Recall and F1 Scores for ANN Classifier (Test) 
 
 
The 100% classification by the ANN classifier is credited to the design of the DoS detection mechanism 
and the quality of features extracted from the traffic flow. The design of the mechanism permits the traffic 
flow to be discretized into traffic flow instances with distinct features describing the flow. Out of the 9 
features in each flow, the SYN_bit feature is of most significant for the classifier in learning the behavior of 
legitimate and malicious traffic flows. When an attacker executes a TCP SYN flood, a high volume of packets 
with the SYN bit set is received on the client machine. Thus by extracting the SYN bit field from the packets 
we increase the classifiers’ ability for detection of such attacks. 
 
 
Fig. 6. SYN bit count in flow instances. 
 
Fig. 6 illustrates the high volume of SYN bit count for the malicious traffic flow instances compared to a 
low count for legitimate traffic flow instances for the dataset used. 
  
7. Conclusion  
The research work carried out addresses a critical issue of VM to VM DoS attacks in a cloud environment. 
An IaaS cloud environment, itself represents a virtual network and thus cloud providers need to provide 
significant level of security to its clients in this network. Relying on security groups of Eucalyptus or AWS 
alone is not sufficient to protect client VMs from DoS attacks such as the TCP SYN flood attack. With strict 
security group rules and SYN cookies enabled on the webserver VM, it was found that TCP SYN flood attacks 
can still deteriorate the performance of a webserver VM running Apache, making it up to 10,100 times 
slower than its normal capacity to respond to requests. 
An approach involving a packets sniffer, feature extraction process and a machine learning algorithm has 
been proposed. Upon training machine learning algorithms with features of legitimate and malicious traffic 
flow instances, the machine learning algorithm can identify malicious traffic from legitimate ones. The kNN 
an ANN classifier models had been evaluated during the training phase and the ANN classifier with 1 
hidden layer was chosen for the test phase based on the F1 score. The chosen ANN classifier model was able 
to provide a F1 score of 1 with the unknown test instances implying a 100% classification accuracy for all 
test instances that was obtained from the dataset generated from the testbed.  
The proposed framework has showed positive results with TCP SYN flood attacks and additionally the 
framework can be experimented with other types of DoS attacks like the ICMP flood and Slowloris attack, 
such that with a security mechanism multiple types of DoS attacks can be detected in the cloud 
environment. In addition, future work on this research can focus on incremental learning. As traffic flow 
changes over time based on certain factors such as increased number of users to a website, an updating 
mechanism can be run on certain time intervals allowing the classifier to learn any new traffic flow patterns. 
Dua and Du [26] also present similar arguments, stating that cyber-infrastructures experience huge 
amounts of continuous and dynamic data and thus incremental learning is essential for machine learning 
algorithms. 
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